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 2 
1 Introduction 
Although substantial investments and efforts have been made to combat corruption in the developing 
world, the effects of conventional anti-corruption interventions remain modest at best (Marquette and 
Pfeiffer 2015; Mungiu-Pippidi 2011). This is often reflected in the so-called implementation gap 
whereby countries continue to perform rather badly despite having adopted legal and institutional 
reforms based on anti-corruption best practices (ibid.). As a consequence, there is growing criticism 
aimed at the seeming impotence of purely legal, institutional interventions focussing on corruption 
opportunities, incentives and risks, because they often fail to adequately take into account the local 
context (Haruna 2003; Mette Kjaer 2004; Ruhumyamiheto 2004), including prevailing social incentives, 
expectations and understandings vis-à-vis corruption (Baez-Camargo and Passas 2017).  
As some authors have argued, corruption may be fuelled by large-scale collective action and 
coordination problems whereby an individual’s decision to behave corruptly hinges upon their 
perception of their close environment as being highly corrupt (Marquette and Pfeiffer 2015; Mungiu-
Pippidi 2011; Persson, Rothstein, and Teorell 2013). Furthermore, corruption may not necessarily 
constitute a problem per se but can actually offer pragmatic solutions to ordinary citizens as means of 
‘getting things done’ (ibid.), while at the level of political and business elites, corruption may fulfil 
informal governance functions critical for regime stability and survival (Baez-Camargo and Ledeneva 
2017).  
Research has only very recently begun to reveal how corrupt practices are perceived in the eyes of 
those directly engaging in them. Emerging evidence suggests that corruption is often seen as either a 
‘necessary evil’ or simply ‘the way things are done’, suggesting a high degree of social acceptability of 
corruption in local contexts where corrupt collective practices have become normalised (Koni-Hoffmann 
and Navanit-Patel 2017). In some cases not adapting to certain normalised behaviours linked to 
corruption may bear high social costs when community expectations are not fulfilled. In other cases, 
mentally engrained collective imaginaries associated to culture or local folklore may reinforce practices 
associated with corruption. Therefore, when certain types of corrupt actions are socially embedded or 
culturally rooted, it can be said that they have become a feature during the enculturation of individuals, 
and thereby become collectively reproduced, normalised and reinforced (cf. Hoff and Stiglitz, 2015). 
The above considerations suggest that there is a crucial need to rethink the formulation of anti-
corruption approaches in order to account for locally prevailing conditions and context-specific drivers 
of corruption - including hidden agendas, social habits and deeply engrained attitudes towards 
corruption (Baez-Camargo and Passas 2017; Koni-Hoffmann and Navanit-Patel 2017). This calls for 
more nuanced complementary approaches that incorporate a contextualised understanding of 
behavioural drivers of corruption.  
Against this backdrop, the UK Department for International Development (DFID), through its East Africa 
Research Fund (EARF), commissioned the Basel Institute on Governance to conduct the research 
project “Corruption, Social Norms and Behaviours in East Africa” (hereafter “the Project”) aiming at 
shedding light into those “[behavioural] factors that influence the propensity for poor people to engage 
in, resist and report ‘corrupt transactions’” in three East African countries, namely Rwanda, Tanzania 
and Uganda.1 The Project activities were undertaken in collaboration with researchers from the 
                                                      
1
 Terms of Reference, Research on Corruption Social Norms and Behaviours in East Africa, published on 9 October 2015 by EARF (DFID).  
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Protestant University of Rwanda and took place between January 2016 and August 2017. The Project 
implementation involved two major components. 
The first component was a semi-systematic literature review (hereafter “the Literature Review”) (Stahl, 
Kassa, and Baez-Camargo 2017) and an accompanying Policy Brief (Baez-Camargo 2017) that compiled 
the evidence about the mechanisms whereby behavioural factors affect decision making related to 
practices of petty corruption and assessed the relative effectiveness of anti-corruption interventions 
targeting petty corruption in developing countries.2  
The second component comprised field research activities exploring the commonalities and differences 
in behavioural influences on attitudes towards petty corruption across the three case study countries, 
focusing on the interactions between ordinary citizens and low-to-mid level officials.3 The field research 
findings have been integrated into three country reports with accompanying policy briefs and a 
synthesis comparative assessment distilling the implications of the research findings for anti-corruption 
practice and corruption research.4  
This report presents the main findings from the field research activities for the case of Rwanda, which 
focused on the health and police sectors. The report is organised as follows: following this introduction, 
Section 2 presents the research design, including the research rationale, the underlying conceptual 
framework, applied methods as well as limitations. Section 3 provides a general background of the 
Rwandan context in terms of the experience in implementing anti-corruption policies and strategies and 
its relevance as a case study for the East Africa region. The main research findings are presented 
subsequently: Section 4 presents the main modalities of petty corruption practices in the health and 
police sectors that were identified in the course of the research activities. Section 5 discusses the 
findings associated with the impact of factors of sociality on attitudes towards petty corruption in the 
Rwandan context. Section 6 is devoted to describing the findings related to how environmental 
heuristics and shared mental models shape the manner in which individuals make decisions on whether 
to engage in or abstain from acts of petty corruption. Section 7 elaborates conclusions on the 
relevance of behavioural factors for understanding petty corruption outcomes in Rwanda and discusses 
policy recommendations.  
 
                                                      
2
 Both documents are accessible on https://www.baselgovernance.org/publications/3623 and https://www.baselgovernance.org/ 
publications/3621respectively.  
3
 A complementary research project, entitled ‘Informal Governance and Corruption – Transcending the Principal-Agent and Collective Action 
Paradigms’, has been commissioned by DFID and the British Academy (BA) and implemented by the Basel Institute on Governance in 
collaboration with University College London (UCL) and the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS). Following an inductive approach – it 
looks at those norms and practices commonly employed by political and business elites. This top-down perspective seeks to uncover unwritten 
rules and behavioural patterns that articulate informal governance regimes associated with high prevalence of corruption. More information 
can be found on: www.britac.ac.uk/anti-corruption, www.britac.ac.uk/node/4660.  
4
 All documents are accessible on: https://www.baselgovernance.org/publications.  
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2 Research Design 
2.1 Rationale and conceptual approach 
A major contribution of this research is the advancement of anti-corruption practice and corruption 
research by investigating the prevalence and impact of behavioural drivers of corruption. Behavioural 
drivers comprise quasi-rational and non-rational factors that are conducive to unfavourable corruption 
outcomes, including collective ways of thinking, mental shortcuts and cues, and socio-cultural 
expectations. In contrast, non-behavioural drivers of corruption are based on rational assumptions of 
human behaviour and include economic, political, institutional and organisational factors. The 
presumption is that behavioural insights can be used to shape innovative anti-corruption policies to 
complement mainstream approaches (cf. Dolan et al. 2010, 8).5  
As per the Terms of Reference for the Project, the conceptual approach that was adopted follows the 
three broad principles of human decision-making identified in the 2015 World Development Report 
(WDR) on ‘Mind, Society and Behaviour’: 
• ‘Thinking automatically’ refers to the propensity of people to make most judgments and 
choices automatically, rather than deliberatively. Individuals typically process imperfect 
information by resorting to shortcuts and reach decisions in response to frames (the way 
choices are presented), anchors (contextual aspects without direct relevance to a decision 
which nonetheless lead individuals to jump to conclusions and make rash decisions) or default 
options (modal patterns of behaviour prevailing in a given social context).  
 
• ‘Thinking socially’ recognises that people are enculturated into acting and thinking collectively.6 
Thus, social values, preferences, norms, identities and networks can exert a decisive influence 
on decision-making because people care about their surroundings and strive to align to what is 
perceived to be socially acceptable. Social determinants of individual choice often revolve 
around issues concerning status, respect, shame, and guilt.  
 
• ‘Thinking with mental models’ means that individuals in any given society share common 
perspectives and ideas through which they make sense of the world around them. In other 
words, decision-making relies on concepts, categories, identities, prototypes, stereotypes 
causal narratives and worldviews drawn from one’s environment. Mental models can refer to 
the macro level, where individuals share a collective vision of how things work around them, 
which might be shaped by factors such as history, ideology, religion and exposure to different 
types of institutions. Mental models can also apply to the micro level, where an individual’s self-
concept may consist of multiple identities, each associated with different norms that dictate 
adequate behaviours for different situations.  
In terms of definitions and operationalisation of key concepts, a first recognition is that petty corruption 
is a highly multifaceted and fluid concept, which may comprise many different practices depending on 
the context. As such, it may not easily be captured in a definition or formula (Ledeneva, Bratu, and 
                                                      
5 Behavioural insights aim to improve development outcomes through a new generation of policies that are empirically grounded and ideally 
experimentally tested. According to the OECD, ‘behavioural insights’ is one discipline in a family of three, the others being behavioural science 
and behavioural economics – that, in addition to traditional economic strategies, use insights from psychology, cognitive science and other 
social science disciplines to unveil the workings of non-rational drivers of human behaviour. More information can be found on: 
www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/behavioural-insights.htm [1 August 2017] 
6 Enculturation refers to processes whereby individuals learn and internalise their group’s culture and social norms through repeated exposure, 
observation and experience, mostly during primary and secondary socialisation (Hoff and Stiglitz 2015; Gavelek and Kong 2012). 
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Köker 2017; Torsello 2011). For this reason, and because the research specifically seeks to shed light 
on behavioural factors impacting attitudes towards petty corruption, a broad approach to studying petty 
corruption has been deemed most appropriate in order to capture the various manners in which 
individuals understand petty corruption and the practices associated with it in their local contexts.  
Therefore, the research focused on informal transactions (i.e. those that do not adhere to formal 
processes and rules) involving low to mid-level officials and ordinary citizens. Embracing a broad view 
was important in order to be able to capture the range of practices that have social and context-specific 
grounding and that blur the lines between what is appropriate and inappropriate behaviours in the 
interactions between citizens and public officials, particularly providers of public services.  
On the basis of this broad approach, practices of petty corruption were identified following 
Transparency International which defines petty corruption as the ‘everyday abuse of entrusted power by 
low- and mid-level public officials in their interaction with ordinary citizens, who often are trying to 
access basic goods or services in places like hospitals, schools, police departments and other 
agencies’ (Transparency International 2009). Thus, the definition utilised captures practices such as 
bribery and favouritism in the different forms they may take. It also captures what the World Bank 
(2010, p. 2) has labelled ‘quiet corruption’ – forms of petty corruption and malpractices of frontline 
providers (such as teachers, health service providers and public officials) that are “difficult to observe 
and quantify […], do not involve monetary exchange […], but whose impact on service delivery and 
regulation has adverse long-term effects on households.” In the developing world, it is primarily through 
corruption that the provision of basic services is disrupted, thereby affecting the poor and vulnerable 
the most (DFID 2015). 
2.2 Research design and methods 
The Project employed a comparative case study approach applied in six regions across the three case 
study countries, with research activities in two regions per country (one urban and one rural area) as 
follows:  
• Urban areas: Kigali (Rwanda), Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) and Kampala (Uganda) 
• Rural areas: Southern Province (Gisagara district) (Rwanda), Kagera region (Tanzania), 
and Northern Uganda (Acholi subregion) (Uganda)  
For each country, two public service sectors of key relevance were selected in consultation with DFID 
experts and local stakeholders, namely, the health and education sectors in Uganda and Tanzania and 
the police and health sectors in Rwanda.  
The methodology consisted of a sequential mixed-methods design comprising focus group discussions 
(FGDs), a vignette-based survey and participant observation. Semi-structured interviews were also 
conducted to complement some of the research findings with the perspectives of the responsible 
authorities.  
The choice of a qualitative methodology is grounded in the fact that, as the Literature Review revealed, 
the Project represents a pioneering study being one of the first efforts to collect empirical data 
establishing the links between behavioural influences and corruption.7 The choice is also justifiable by 
                                                      
7 To our knowledge Koni-Hoffmann and Navanit-Patel, (2017) for the case of Nigeria and the on-going project “Corruption in the Criminal 
Justice Sector” of the Fletcher School at Tufts University [http://fletcher.tufts.edu/Institute-for-Human-Security/Research/Corruption] for 
the cases of Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo are the only studies to have explicitly taken this approach to date. 
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the primary aim of this research to accurately capture the aforementioned hidden, clandestine and 
covert forms of petty and ‘quiet’ corruption (cf. World Bank 2010). In this regard, the research activities, 
although guided by the findings from the Literature Review, were to a large extent exploratory given the 
scarcity of empirical evidence and analysis. Although an effort was made to quantify some of the 
findings through the implementation of a survey, given sampling and resource constraints the survey is 
meant to yield insights indicative of prevailing patterns and does not represent statistically significant 
national-level trends. Therefore, data analysis of the survey remained qualitative in nature. For both the 
FGDs and the survey a purposive sampling strategy was employed in order to maintain the focus 
narrowly aimed at the prospective beneficiaries of anti-corruption interventions.  
2.2.1 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) 
Two categories of FGDs were convened in each of the two research areas: 
• Citizens/users 
• Service providers: teachers and nurses 
The following are the backgrounds of the FGD participants in both areas: 
Rural Gisagara District 
Service seekers: 
• Motorists and drivers  
• Mothers with child(ren) under the age of five  
• Community healthcare volunteer (abajyanama b’ubuzima)  
• Business people (small trade), a representative of citizens that are physically challenged, 
youth (educated and non-educated), a member of a women’s association, elderly and a 
member of a traditional court (abunzi) 
Service providers: 
• Nurses in public healthcare facilities 
• Workers in Isange One Stop Centre (rehabilitation centre run by police) 
• Lawyer who worked with one public hospital 
Urban Gikondo District (Kigali) 
Service seekers: 
• Drivers 
• Women 
• Representative of youth 
• Elderly 
• Member of community councils 
Service providers: 
• Nurses in public healthcare facilities and teaching hospital 
BASEL INSTITUTE ON GOVERNANCE 
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• Lawyer 
The FGDs followed a protocol of prioritised topics relevant for the research and validated by the 
Project’s expert advisory group, testing for the prevalence of petty corrupt practices, as well as for the 
most relevant concepts appearing in the literature. The findings from the FGDs were subsequently used 
to revise and refine the survey instrument. 
2.2.2 Vignette-based survey  
The second research instrument is a vignette-based survey consisting of two components. In the first 
section, basic demographic information was gathered and respondents were probed on a variety of 
topics including prevalence of corruption in the chosen sectors, level of trust towards different public, 
political and social institutions, and prevalence of certain social norms and values in the respective 
communities.  
In the second section, fourteen ‘survey vignettes’ were developed in order to focus the inquiry into the 
key topics that were uncovered in the FGDs. 8 One of the main goals of the survey was to try to tease 
out whether there are differences in attitudes toward corruption depending on its intended outcome. 
Each ‘vignette’ describes a scenario or an instance representing one of four distinct types of corrupt 
practices, namely: 
• ‘Greasing the system’: expediting access to a service or resource one is entitled to 
• Obtaining access to a service or resource one is not entitled to  
• Avoiding a sanction 
• Personal enrichment 
In the vignettes, a distinction was made on whether a corrupt action responds to the expectations and 
obligations associated with informal social networks. Survey respondents were divided into two groups: 
In the first group, the respondents were asked to rate the degree to which the action in question is of a 
corrupt nature. Ratings were made on a scale from 0 to 5 where 0 is not corrupt and 5 is maximum 
corruption. In the second group, the respondents were asked to rate the likelihood that they would 
engage in such behaviour. Ratings were made on a scale from 0 to 5 where 0 means “I would never do 
it” and 5 means “I would certainly do it”. These two modalities probe for what respondents believe is 
morally right or wrong and for what they would actually consider being involved in (on a more pragmatic 
basis). This distinction is relevant given the emerging insights into the ambivalent distinction between 
what is deemed to be correct and what is accepted as necessary in one’s own context. 
A total of 596 surveys were conducted across the three countries of which 204 were applied in Uganda 
(100 in the Gulu District and 104 in Kampala), 200 were applied in Tanzania (100 in Kagera region and 
100 in Dar es Salaam) and 192 were applied in Rwanda (94 in Gisagara district and 98 in Kigali).  
The purposive sample design included low income and middle class individuals in their 20s and 30s (to 
capture women in child-bearing age and parents of children attending public schools), elderly, and 
public sector workers. 
                                                      
8 This methodological vignette approach has been developed and tested by Sautu and colleagues (Sautu 2009, 2004, 2002) who developed a 
corruption tolerance index studying the propensity of the Buenos Aires middle-class to engage in corruption.  
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2.2.3 Interviews 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with management level actors in the two case study sectors 
as well as with individuals with experiences particularly befitting of the research focus areas as 
described below: 
• Officer in charge of social affairs and notary and legal service at sector level 
• Head nurse in healthcare facility 
• Officers from the Rwanda Biomedical Center 
• Former officers of the Ministry of Health 
• Police officers 
• Officers of anti-corruption agencies 
• Representative of transport agencies  
• Participants involved in facilitating driving licence exams  
2.2.4 Limitations 
As has been mentioned earlier, it is important to underscore the pioneering nature of this research. As 
such, the research activities must be considered as exploratory and constituting a first step towards 
compiling empirical evidence on the nature of prevailing behavioural influences on the attitudes towards 
petty corruption among citizens in the three countries. Thus, the research findings seek to shed light on 
broad patterns characterising behaviours, choices, incentives, beliefs and understandings of citizens 
that impact prevailing levels of petty corruption in the sectors studied. The limited sample sizes also 
signify that the findings are indicative and at best representative of the communities in which the 
research activities took place and are in no way statistically generalisable to the entire national context. 
Rather, the primary aim is to account for analytical generalisation (cf. Yin 1998, 2014) by cross-
comparing the results from the three case studies through a behavioural lens as stipulated by the 
conceptual framework (WDR). In order to validate the findings of the research, efforts have been made 
to corroborate the trends captured in the research with results from major surveys conducted at the 
national level such as the East Africa Bribery Index 2017. However, while the research suggests that 
informal practices (such as favouritism and gift-giving) have a central role in shaping outcomes in the 
provision of public services, many of the behaviours documented have not been to date properly 
quantified by means of national level representative surveys. In this regard, the research findings should 
be interpreted as the output of a first-phase exploratory inquiry that draws the attention of practitioners 
to certain social dynamics and points to topics in need for further research.  
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3 Rwanda: Background 
Since the genocide in 1994, Rwanda has been praised for its development model through which 
formidable changes have been achieved. The Rwandan government under Paul Kagame’s leadership 
has managed to sustain economic growth, reduce poverty, improve political stability and tackle 
corruption. Among international donors and anti-corruption practitioners, Rwanda is considered one of 
the African success stories and a potential role model to other countries (Crisafulli and Redmond 
2012).  
The key driver of these remarkable improvements is to be found in Rwanda’s governance model based 
on authority, leadership and decision-making. This model is notorious for strictly enforcing the rule of 
law, its high degree of organisational efficiency, its praised resource management capacity, as well as 
the effective delivery of public services and, of course, the control of corruption (Bozzini 2014; Golooba-
Mutebi and Booth 2013).  
The Rwandan government has made the fight against corruption one of its top national priorities by 
ensuring that adequate anti-corruption legal frameworks and monitoring institutions are in place. It has 
formalised a ‘zero-tolerance’ approach to corruption based on harsh punishments and strict law 
enforcement, while at the same time sensitising the public about the value of anti-corruption and 
integrity.9 Owing to the Government’s strong commitment and political will to curb corruption, Rwanda 
is now among the least corrupt countries in Africa. In 2016, Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) ranked Rwanda in 50th position (with an overall score of 54) – becoming the third 
best performer in Africa (together with Mauritius) only after Botswana (at 35th position) and Cape Verde 
(at 38th position). Similarly, according to the 2016 Wold Bank’s Worldwide Governance indicators, 
Rwanda scored very high values (of 75) for the ‘control of corruption’ indicator.  
However, while some hail the country as a star performer and a model for the developing world, other 
sources have been more critical suggesting that Rwanda’s performance is weak on indicators of voice 
and accountability, transparency and civil society engagement (Bozzini 2014).10 There are also claims 
that accountability enacting institutions, such as the media, civil society, parliament and the judiciary 
only play a secondary role in the fight of corruption (ibid.).  
The Rwandan government staunchly rejects such criticisms pointing to concrete counter examples to 
those claims. For instance, there are plenty mechanisms of accountability in place across the Rwandan 
public administration that incorporate significant checks and balances on the actions of the regime. A 
salient example is the report of the Auditor General, which is delivered on an annual basis to the Public 
Accounts Committee of Parliament and broadcasted live.11 Other mechanisms of accountability and 
                                                      
9 Key legislations set in place include the law (no 23/2003) on prevention and repression of corruption and related offences and penal codes 
article 220-227 and 633-651. Article 633 of the penal code defines corruption as “any act of abuse of a position, power or honour one enjoys 
within a state organ, in a public or private institution, in a foreign company or international organization working in the country, or power 
conferred by any other function which is used contrary to the law, by giving to oneself, giving to others or requiring an illegal benefit or a 
service contrary to the law”. A Whistleblower Protection Law (no 35/2012) was passed in 2012. Anti-corruption institutions include the Office 
of the Ombudsmen, the Rwanda Public Procurement Authority, the Office of the Auditor General, the Rwanda Revenue Authority’s anti-
corruption unit and the Public Procurement Appeals Commission. The Office of the Ombudsmen has launched sensitisation and awareness-
raising campaigns to prime the public about anti-corruption and integrity and organises a yearly anti-corruption week (Gatwa 2017; Bozzini 
2014). Other anti-corruption campaigns are regularly undertaken within the Judiciary system [Supreme Court, Courts and Tribunals]; the 
Rwanda National Police; by the Ministry of Home Affairs and Local Government and the Ministry of Labour as well as in the media. 
10 Examples of the sources referenced by this author are: the World Bank Country Performance and Institutional Assessment, the Bertelsmann 
Transformation Index, the Mo Ibrahim Index and the African Development Bank Country Performance Rating.  
11 The Auditor General of Rwanda emphasised in an interview with two of the researchers the seriousness with which the duty of accountability 
of his office to Parliament is taken: “I can delay the report one hour but not a day.” 
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transparency at national and local levels include the annual evaluation of the achievements of national 
development projects (Imihigo) both at the district and national levels, the National Leadership Retreat, 
and the National Dialogue. 
Controversies aside, it is clear that Rwanda outperforms other countries in the region in containing 
petty corruption in its public sector. Therefore, Rwanda represents a crucial case demanding careful 
study of the diverse factors that underpin that success, including the strengths and shortcomings of the 
approaches employed by the government authorities but also the social determinants that would 
reinforce state policies from the bottom-up. In particular, the Rwandan case raises important questions 
within the scope of the Project. For instance, has the Rwandan regime incorporated behavioural 
elements into its anti-corruption strategies? Do social norms and values, and shared mental models and 
other contextual features particular to Rwanda inherently promote better anti-corruption results? Have 
sociocultural attributes been reshaped as a result of a stronger enforcement of the rule of law? The 
present report aims to provide insights conducive to responding to these questions.  
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4 Characterising petty corruption and its 
modalities 
On the basis of the research findings, this section points to the different behaviours and practices 
associated to petty corruption that are said to be recurrent in the Rwandan health sector and the police 
and law enforcement, reflecting also on their prevalence and the enabling circumstances in which they 
take place. Due note is also taken of the countervailing mechanisms and circumstances that work in 
preventing corruption from occurring in the provision of public services in Rwanda.  
4.1 Corruption in the interactions between service providers and users in the health sector 
A key aspect of public service delivery concerns the manner in which citizens can access public goods 
and services. In particular in relation to accessing public health services, the FGD findings suggest that 
urban users normally feel that they are “well treated, received and respected”.12 According to the 
generalised experiences among research participants, services are provided as mandated by the rules 
and regulations governing the public provision of health services in Rwanda. These rules and regulations 
emanate from Ubudehe, which is a poverty reduction initiative and one of the country’s core 
development programmes. Ubudehe involves a system of categorisation of all households according to 
income level, which forms the basis to determine entitlements and for the allocation of subsidies. The 
national health system requires that all citizens submit themselves to the ubudehe categorisation, in 
which service users are divided into four categories: category 1 corresponds to the poorest households 
whose members enjoy unlimited access to public health services provided free of charge. Ubudehe 
categories 2, 3 and 4 comprise more affluent citizens who are required to contribute a co-payment 
commensurate to their income level when accessing public health services.13 Community councils are 
(usually) responsible for the implementation of the Ubudehe categorisation process and for ensuring 
that citizens receive government-issued health insurance cards, which are essential for accessing 
health care services.14  
Citizens and service providers participating in the study also widely shared the expectation that 
deviation from the formal rules in the provision of health services, including acts of corruption, involve 
significant risks of detection and punishment. Indeed, the research findings suggest that the potential 
of deviant behaviours being exposed and the harsh legal repercussions that may follow act as powerful 
deterrent. The importance of behaving according to the law resonates with the survey results in which a 
majority of respondents most closely self-identified with vignettes of individuals characterised as law 
abiding.15  
Consequently, the experiences shared within the FGDs indicate that service providers typically apply 
the correct co-payment rates when treating service seekers who are in possession of valid health 
                                                      
12 This positive evaluation was not equally embraced by all research participants as a participant from the rural area complained that “they [the 
health workers] do not respect us. […] Surprisingly, when we go to hospitals or health centres in the city [Butare-Huye] or to private centres, 
we are well received and respected.” As the second part of the comment suggests, the account given is indicative of local variation in 
standards of health care provision rather than systematic difference in the standard of care between urban and rural facilities since the FGD 
participants from the latter area, while unanimous about the poor service in their health centre, also confirmed that treatment is appropriate 
when they seek health service in neighbouring Sectors (as well as at the Kabutare health centre in Butare). 
13 Citizens belonging to categories 2 and 3 usually pay 3000 RWF per person annually to be enrolled and receive medical treatment with a 
subsequent10% co-pay for treatment incurred, whereas individuals in category 4 are liable to pay 7000 RWF per person annually also with a 
10% co-pay.  
14 Service seekers lacking health insurance cards must cover the full costs of the health services obtained. 
15 34% of survey respondents identified a law-abiding character as being ‘like me’ while 32% said such character would be ‘very much like me’. 
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insurance cards and that patients receive adequate treatment in an equitable manner. This in turn 
results in a positive evaluation of the quality and accessibility of health services. Indeed, research 
participants agree that users do not face any major challenges nor need to result to informal strategies 
to receive the services they are entitled to. This perception is further echoed by the high percentage 
(43%) of survey respondents who reported having ‘high levels of trust’ in the health services provided in 
Rwanda.  
Within this context of strict enforcement of the rule of law, research participants nonetheless identified 
four types of practices involving petty corruption that still take place in the Rwandan health sector: 
a) bribing during the health insurance card registration process,  
b) favouritism in the service provision (particularly in the rural areas probed), 
c) gift-giving 
d) bribery (more prevalent in the urban setting). 
Research participants noted that unsolicited bribery can take place during the ubudehe categorisation 
process. Since category 1 insurance card holders are eligible for free health services, more affluent 
individuals in the rural area have been known to offer bribes to be assigned to that category. Urban 
focus group discussants in Kigali also reported instances where council officials solicit a small 
facilitation payment in cases where the applicants’ documentation has been incomplete, incorrect, or 
when the application processing or the issuance of the health insurance card have been delayed. For 
instance, one female participant recalled an experience involving the medical treatment of a child at 
King Faysal hospital that resulted in treatment costs of over 7 million Rwandan Franc (RWF). Although 
the health insurance card for the child had been paid, it had nevertheless not been activated in time. In 
view of that situation, the family then paid akantu [something] for the card to be antedated. Another 
participant shared a similar experience: “there is a lot of bribery and corruption in local offices of 
Mutuelle de Santé […], it happened to me [that] my household employee felt ill on the weekend but his 
health insurance card was not yet enacted. Therefore I paid akantu [something] and his card was 
enacted with anticipated date.” Urban FGD participants agreed that, although these kinds of corrupt 
incidences during Ubudehe registration were widespread, they were also being addressed through 
increased monitoring and by the digitisation of the registration process.  
A second type of corrupt practice that research participants identified as occurring in the health sector 
involved favouritism, which was said to persist partly due to the influence of family traditions and values 
prevailing in Rwandan society. While favouritism could be regarded as less detrimental compared to 
other corrupt practices, it is still a form of quiet and moral corruption that can compromise the 
effectiveness of service delivery and lead to distress among service users. In the research data, 
favouritism came up as a problem more frequently in the rural as compared to the urban areas, perhaps 
reflecting the smaller community sizes and a higher intensity in the social contacts among community 
members. 
Favouritism was said to affect practices of recruitment when council and government officials resort to 
hiring friends and family members instead of those who performed better in employment tests. FGD 
participants from the rural area also related encountering instances of favouritism when preferential 
(faster) treatment is given to the family and friends of service providers. Although every service seeker 
holding a valid insurance card will get treated, there was a perception that those lacking social 
connections may face longer waiting times and be treated less courteously. However, it was also 
acknowledged that health workers do prioritise service according to need as noted by one research 
participant, who stated that preferential treatment is often given to the most needy, such as “the case 
of an old person, a pregnant woman or a person with disability […], and people find it normal.” 
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A third informal practice occurring in the context of health service provision is unsolicited gift-giving on 
the part of service users. Like in many other African countries, gift-giving is a deeply embedded social 
practice in Rwanda and is an inherent part of local culture and customs. As such, it is deeply engrained 
in the minds of people and practised widely. However, the challenging quality of gift-giving emerges if it 
is understood to solicit a reciprocal gesture in return; that is, when the gift generates perceptions of 
indebtedness on the part of the recipient and of entitlement on the part of the giver. In this regard, a 
nurse in the urban FGD shared her own experience with the practice of gift-giving - when after providing 
treatment diligently to a woman - the patient’s husband came into her office, handed her a bag of rice 
and left before the nurse had time to comment. The unspoken meaning of the gift was revealed some 
days later, when the husband called to request that the nurse help his sister-in-law who was in labour. 
Furthermore, one has to account for local meanings and symbolisms in order to appreciate the 
ambivalent nature of a gift. For instance, in Rwanda, the most generous and obeisant of gifts is 
traditionally a cow. A rural service user tells the story of how her father gifted a cow to their family 
doctor as a token of true appreciation after he had treated his sick child. After this very generous one-
time gift, the doctor gave privileged treatment to the family, even receiving them in his private residence 
to provide medical care and advice. Thus, although in principle aligned with practices of sociality, gift-
giving is problematic in the context of public service provision because it can create a personal bond 
between providers and users at the expense of non-gift givers and therefore constitutes a challenge to 
equitable service provision.  
However, service seekers from Kigali indicated that the practice of gift-giving with the purpose of 
securing preferential treatment diminished significantly after officials introduced the requirement to 
take a number when awaiting treatment based on the ‘first come, first served’ principle. It may 
therefore not come as a surprise that the survey findings inform that when citizens encounter problems 
with public service providers they assert that ‘gift-giving’ is the least preferred strategy to employ. 
Furthermore, gift-giving to public officials is regulated under the Leadership Code of Conduct, which 
stipulates that a public officer who receives a gift worth more than 50.000RWF must declare it to the 
Office of the Ombudsman and gifts above 100,000RWF are not allowed as noted by the Deputy 
Ombudsman of Rwanda during the consultation workshop for the Project held in Kigali. 
Finally, FGD participants also discussed the prevalence of bribery in the Rwandan health sector. When it 
comes to the actual interaction between health service providers and service seekers in the rural 
district of Gisagara, FGD participants stated that incidences of bribery have diminished to a great extent 
due to the tightening of anti-corruption law enforcement. In fact, in the rural area, FGD participants did 
not report incidences of bribery between heath providers and service seekers. However, in Kigali, 
bribery appears to be more likely to occur than in rural areas as suggested by the urban respondents 
who discussed in detail the different modalities in which bribery takes place. Nonetheless, even in the 
urban FGDs, the discussion emphasised that indeed bribery has become more difficult to negotiate and 
tends to occur only if service seeker and provider know each other. As one participant noted: 
“corruption has become more and more a private affair due to harsh punishments.”  
The survey results capture these differences regarding the prevalence of corruption in the health sector, 
as Figure 1 shows. 
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 Is corruption prevalent in the health sector in Rwanda? 16 
4.2 Corruption in the Rwanda National Police  
According to the Rwanda Governance Board Score Card, the Rwanda National Police (RNP) is one of 
the most highly regarded and respected institutions [second to the Army] with overwhelming (96.7 %) 
levels of confidence reported in 2015. Similarly, that same year, the RNP was judged “the most 
professional of all African police” by the German ambassador.17 
Nonetheless, the RNP by other accounts continues to be perceived as one of the most corrupt 
institutions in Rwanda. According to our survey, the perceived prevalence of corruption in the police 
sector is relatively high as shown in Figure 2 (next page).  
Survey results from the rural Gisagara District also reflect negative attitudes toward the RNP, with the 
highest number of responses (32%) reporting ‘low trust’ in the police. A common recurring incidence of 
corruption frequently described by urban service seekers is bribery between drivers and traffic police 
officers. 
 
 Is corruption prevalent in the police sector in Rwanda?  
                                                      
16 The percentages do not add up to 100 per cent as blank statements have been excluded from this presentation.  
17 The German Ambassador to Rwanda, Peter Fahrenhotz commended Rwanda for having “one of the most professional police forces on the 
continent, which is a step towards the country’s quest of achieving middle income status..... “I have witnessed high dedication and 
commitment of Rwanda National Police. I also see a high degree of integrity and honesty among the police officers which is very important,” “I 
have been in many African countries and I believe RNP is the best in Africa. There is no developed country that doesn’t have a good police 
force. There is a clear connection between having development, good governance, good politics and having a good police force; you cannot 
separate them...” he noted (New Times 2015). 
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It should be noted that the RNP has put in place several measures to fight corruption within its ranks, 
including the regular publication of statistics on crimes and offenders, education programmes, and 
promoting deterrence through internal disciplinary mechanisms, such as the creation of a specialised 
anti-corruption unit. The zero-tolerance approach is reflected in the number of dismissals, which in 
2015 amounted to more than 200 police officers, while 90 officers were dismissed in 2016.18 
According to the police laws even when an officer is not prosecuted in a court of law, they are subject 
to internal discipline, detention, suspension and even dismissal should their behaviour be suspect 
(Gatwa 2017).19 
In spite of these efforts, the RNP administration acknowledges the prevalence of corruption in the Road 
Traffic, Motor Technical Control and Crime Investigation departments. In this regard, the research data 
suggests that drivers frequently initiate bribes in order to avoid high formal fines for traffic violations. 
Currently the fine for speeding amounts to a third of a median salary and several urban FGD 
respondents share the opinion that the bribes given to avoid traffic offenses could be circumvented by 
lowering the respective fines. As one male respondent put it: “Do you really think that an amount like 
10 or 15 thousand would not make people think? If the penalty was reduced, the government can 
generate more revenues […], at the same time corruption would be reduced because people would not 
risk a bigger fine for bribery compared to a relatively small penalty for speeding.” Another respondent (a 
lorry driver), who has frequent encounters with the traffic police, said that “given the size of the penalty 
– [I] explore all options to pay akantu [something] to avoid the heavy penalty.” Other accounts suggest 
that in some instance police officers take advantage of the high costs of the fines to solicit bribes from 
traffic violators. Overall, this is an interesting point because it shows that excessively high fines may 
have a counter effect and actually increase the propensity to engage in bribery – even in environments 
were laws are strictly enforced.  
Furthermore, bribing may also occur when driver licences are issued. According to rural respondents, 
some police officials obtain the bribes collected by driving school managers who act as intermediaries. 
Nonetheless, bribery during the delivery of licences has diminished remarkably given the harsh 
punishment and preventive measures that have been put in place, such as the digitisation of services 
and the creation of a specialised anti-corruption unit within the police force.20  
4.3 Victims and perpetrators of corruption 
Women are the social group most vulnerable to corruption according to FGD participants from both the 
Gisagara district and Kigali. Women were identified as particularly vulnerable to corruption, because in 
rural areas men may subject them to ‘sexual corruption’. In fact, in rural areas single women appear to 
be particularly likely to fall victim of corruption by male public officials. These findings are in line with a 
report of the Ministry of Labour presented to the Parliament, which suggested that 49% of women in 
search for employment have been subjected to sexual harassment.  
Other relevant findings pertain to the attitudes towards denouncing corrupt acts. In the rural FGDs, 
participants agreed that ordinary citizens do not often venture to denounce a corrupt official out of fear 
                                                      
18 The officers, dismissed in 2015 by the Cabinet meeting chaired by President Paul Kagame, were of varying ranks and fired over several 
charges of misconduct. Those dismissed included one Superintendent of Police, four at the rank of Chief Inspector of Police (CIP); 23 
Inspectors of Police (IP), and 38 Assistant Inspectors of Police (AIP). Others are 65 Non-Commissioned Officers and 67 Police Constables 
(New Times 2017; Igihe 2017). 
19 Interview held on 4 November 2016 with RNP Commissioner head of Ethics Department. 
20 Such measures were well documented by the National Rwanda Police representative attending the consultation workshop that was 
organised on 27 July 2017 in Kigali to request feedback from local stakeholders regarding the findings of the Project. 
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of reprisal. In contrast with rural respondents, city dwellers feel more comfortable denouncing corrupt 
agents. According to FGD participants, this is done by giving information to superiors or resorting to 
alternative means, such as contacting the media and using social media. 
An interesting insight came from the accounts of FGD participants, reporting the emergence of a new 
phenomenon of intermediaries or ‘brokers’ in corruption practices. In such instances, a person 
unknown to a service seeker may reach out by mobile telephone and offer to solve a problem at stake, 
such as paying a bill or any other matter needing prompt resolution. When the deal is concluded and 
the money paid through the channel given [for example through mobile phone money transfer], then the 
service is expedited, without the service seeker ever meeting the ‘broker’. This increases the payment 
of the service seeker as it includes the fee for the ‘broker’. Important implications that follow from this 
new phenomenon is the likelihood that public officers may be involved in such practices, particularly, 
because the broker is aware of on-going procedures and has the contact details of the service seeker 
(Gatwa 2017). Furthermore, the emergence of anonymous, impersonal corruption schemes also shows 
how the threat of detection may have resulted in certain cases to the development of more secretive 
modalities for engaging in corrupt actions in Rwanda.  
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5 The role of social networks and the 
importance of social variables  
Social norms and values can be understood as standardised generalisations concerning expected 
modes of behaviour among community members and therefore represent an important source of 
guidance on how to act in particular situations. Repeated social interactions and extended exposure to 
a given social structure leads to certain behavioural patterns becoming internalised and normalised, 
thereby forming collective social norms and practices (World Bank 2015; Hoff and Stiglitz 2015). In 
environments where high levels of corruption prevail, practices of petty corruption, including bribery and 
gift-giving, may therefore be perceived as the norm, and as such, become socially accepted and even 
prescribed (Lindner 2014; Banuri and Eckel 2012; Jackall 1988; Anders 2002; Anders 2005). In fact, 
individuals in such contexts may come to consider petty corrupt practices as either the way things are 
done or even as beneficial if direct personal benefits are derived (cf. Stahl, Kassa, and Baez-Camargo 
2017).  
In this section, we present the findings associated with the social context and the manner in which 
accepted norms and values shape behaviours linked to the prevalence of petty corruption in Rwanda. A 
salient topic that emerges from the research findings links reported experiences with petty corruption 
to informal social networks, their functional and structural attributes, the social dynamics they 
reinforce, as well as the costs and tensions they generate.  
5.1 Social networks as means to securing preferential treatment 
A salient topic in reference to the impact of sociality and social norms on attitudes towards petty 
corruption is the role played by informal social networks. Any given individual is naturally part of a 
multiplicity of social networks, beginning with the closest ones comprised by family and friends and 
extending to networks involving more distant acquaintances, such as school peers, neighbours, fellow 
church (or mosque) goers and so on. The research findings confirm the insights from the literature 
review suggesting that social networks are particularly relevant in East Africa as the strong personal 
connections among members constitute an effective mechanism to pool scarce resources and provide 
access to goods, services, resources and even career opportunities for those involved (Jauregui, 2014; 
Ruud, 2000; Chang et.al 2001; Grodeland et al., 1998; Ledeneva, 1997; Sneath, 2002). It is for these 
reasons that social networks constitute an informal social safety net that helps people cope with 
resource scarcity and, as such, are highly valued.  
In the comparative discussion about the centrality of social networks in East Africa it is important to 
make a conceptual clarification. Whereas it is clear that individuals belong to multiple, overlapping 
networks anywhere, the type of networks that are emphasised in this Project are those to which the 
individual feels bound by obligations that are primordial because they are enforced and sanctioned by 
stringent social controls. Those networks are the social equivalent to what the political sciences refers 
to as the leader’s ‘winning coalition’ (Mesquita et al. 2005), meaning those constituencies whose 
support is most essential for maintaining legitimacy in the case of the political leader, and status and 
social recognition in the case of the individual. The networks understood in this manner are also 
interchangeably referred to as cliques, which is the subset of individuals in a wider network in which 
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actors are more closely and intensely tied to one another,21 or as reference group (following Koni-
Hoffmann and Navanit-Patel 2017). 
In the case of Rwanda, the research suggests that the family constitutes the most relevant network or 
reference group and that some of the most important determinants of behaviours are related to the 
individual obligations associated with kinship ties. People are expected to look after family members, 
otherwise they may be subjected to shame and blame. The importance of strong family ties is even 
enshrined in common Rwandan proverbs, such as: utagira nyirasenge arisenga [whoever does not have 
an aunt slips in isolation], urukwavu rukuze rwonka abana [the old rabbit is taken care of by its children], 
inkoko ivuye mu magi aba amahuri [when the chicken leaves the eggs they rot] impyisi y’iwanyu ikurya 
ikurundarunda [the wolf from your village –clan- will devour you gently].  
While family ties dominated the discussions about sociality, FGD participants also attested to the 
importance of other types of social networks such as those based on ‘mutual self-protection’ 
[ishyirahamwe rya duhishirane]22 – which are articulated on the basis of other social criteria such as 
profession or with a view to resolving particular problems (Gatwa forthcoming 2018). For example, in 
the Gisagara district, FGD participants described that community saving groups have been organised 
among the most needy to bear the costs of health insurance for which the payment is usually required 
at once. The central value ascribed to the social networks suggests that a strong communitarian mind 
set is prevalent among Rwandans. This insight was confirmed by the survey results that showed that a 
large percentage of respondents (38%) did not identify at all with a character described as on who “lives 
life fully autonomously and tries to rely on other people’s help as little as possible.”  
Social networks are especially relevant to the research because they affect the delivery of public 
services through favouritism, which is linked to the functionality of social networks when it comes to 
accessing public services. In fact, in the case of health services, discussants agreed that the only way 
to speed up treatment is precisely through social networks, for instance by appealing to a relative or 
friend that is either a service provider or has the influence to intercede on the patient’s behalf. For 
example, social networks can be activated to reach out and appeal to influential individuals who can 
authorise the transfer of a patient from a local clinic to a district reference hospital. Overall, the 
participants in the FGD in Kigali agreed that health services in urban health centres are expedited for 
relatives of service providers. 
The research captured substantial discussions about the sense of moral obligation to treat family 
members preferentially among service providers. Pointing to the tensions between work and family 
responsibilities, one service provider rhetorically asked “[what] else can you do if you don’t serve [your] 
family members?”, suggesting that failing to do so throws into question the individual’s value in the 
community. Indeed, the FGD findings point out that if meaningful social ties are present, it is extremely 
difficult for service providers to withhold a favour. A participant from Kigali explained: “no one can 
ignore the importance [that] Rwandan people attach to relationships and [there are] consequences 
associated with not serving the neighbour or one of your family members, even when the situation does 
not allow [you to do so].” Such consequences were highlighted by a participant in the service providers’ 
FGD from the rural area, who said: “Actually when you refuse to render the service, people to whom you 
are associated with will say [of you] that ‘having him is like not having someone’ or ‘do not expect any 
help from…’.” The FGD participants further elaborated that a bad reputation can “travel” and as a 
consequence the service provider involved might lose friends or even garner disdain from extended 
family members.  
                                                      
21 See http://faculty.ucr.edu/~hanneman/nettext/C11_Cliques.html [25 August 2017]. 
22 This kind of social network is what Baez-Camargo and Sambaiga (2015) labelled self-help associations in the case of Tanzania. 
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As noted by service providers, Rwandan citizens also attach a great deal of importance to other social 
relationships, including friends and neighbours. Within networks of close friends, participants reported 
that in instances where a servicer user is a ‘friend of the officer’, bribes are more likely to occur. The 
social relationship is used to create a private space where a bribe or informal gift can be negotiated and 
exchanged away from the eye of the law enforcement authorities and under the cover of the trust 
vested in the friendship.  
Thus, social relationships influence expectations to a significant extent about what constitute 
appropriate behaviours in different scenarios, sometimes in direct conflict with what the law prescribes. 
For instance, survey respondents under the age of 30 most often rated that it is ‘not corrupt’ for a 
police officer ‘to intervene on behalf of a friend who is at fault in a serious traffic accident’. Social 
networks are also associated with corruption through the pressure they exert on public sector 
employees to utilise their positions and extract rents or unduly exercise their authority to distribute 
benefits among the group.23 In fact, according to FGD respondents, direct family members would not 
question the source of wealth of a relative who shares with the family and attends to their needs.  
From the perspective of users, social networks are used instrumentally, to solve the problems and 
challenges at hand or, as one research participant put it, to “ease [one’s] life.” Thus, people resort to 
their social networks to establish an informal connection with the service provider or decision-maker 
that can provide assistance. However, service providers can also use their positions to build up their 
networks in those spheres where service users (of strategic interest to the providers) require some 
help. Such strategic considerations about building social connections that take place during the 
interactions at the point of service delivery can be illustrated with the following experience recounted 
by a FGD participant: “I was aware that I will need to ask him [a patient] to admit my child in his school. 
Because I had not had any contact [relationship] with him, I took the advantage to let him be treated 
first although he was not the first one, so that I could prepare the ground. Of course I had to pass 
through a friend of mine who is close to that headmaster but it was also my responsibility to find a way 
out of my concern.” Therefore, service provision might be affected by the network-building calculations 
of users and service providers alike. 
The instrumentality of social networks also suggests that it is particularly useful to extend one’s 
connections to include powerful individuals. Based on this assessment, district authorities or ranking 
officers of law enforcement agencies sometimes obtain preferential treatment at public health facilities. 
While granting such a person preferential treatment might be considered a question of respect for the 
authority, it may also be facilitated by the desirability of building a personal relationship with the 
influential individual on the part of the service provider. A service provider who participated in the 
research recounted how a colleague got in trouble for allowing a person of authority to queue just like 
everyone else because that was seen as a disrespectful act. Therefore, according to this person’s point 
of view, favouring influential people in the service provision is the reasonable thing to do because it 
demonstrates respect for hierarchies but also because “this favour towards authority may yield some 
benefit in the future, you never know!”. Similar attitudes were further confirmed by the survey findings 
where male respondents most often stated that it is ‘not corrupt’ for a police officer ‘to be paid an 
informal fee to escort the son of a superior during a trip on dangerous roads’. 
                                                      
23 In a somewhat surprising result, most often survey respondents were of the opinion that it is ‘not corrupt’ for a nurse to ‘resell stolen 
medicines in the black market to pay for the wedding of a daughter. While these responses could suggest that family obligations are seen as 
justifying illicit actions, it has been suggested that the responses have to do with the fact that the Rwandan criminal code does not categorise 
theft and embezzlement as crimes of corruption. In this view, it is possible that for respondents in the survey, embezzlement is more than 
corruption; in fact it is a criminal offense punishable by law. More research on how average Rwandan citizens operationalise such terms would 
be desirable to delve into such a finding. 
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Social networks are thus effective problem-solving resources for individuals to a large extent because of 
the collective appraisal, notion and conception that obligations towards the group are binding. This 
relevance stems from the fact that the social norms of reciprocity that bind networks together are 
grounded in deeply held values in Rwandan society such as solidarity and duty to the common good. 
This is mirrored in several traditional proverbs: ineza yiturwa indi (generosity is rewarded by another 
generosity), akebo kajya iwa mugarura [a basket of crops goes where it would be reciprocated]. Indeed 
in the survey, 45% of respondents indicated that they feel a very strong obligation to reciprocate favours 
received from friends and acquaintances. In this social context, as mentioned above, service providers 
can be subjected to significant pressure on the part of their social networks while performing their 
public function. Indeed, evidence form the FGDs suggest that in Rwanda nobody would renounce their 
social ties and links – especially when there is a sense of ‘shared experience and relations’. This often 
drives them to ‘unwillingly or willingly’ comply with unwritten rules for reciprocation inherent to a social 
network – leading to favouritism becoming a socially and culturally reproduced practice grounded on a 
strong sense of indebtedness based on moral obligation amongst members of a social network.  
5.2 Social networks and corruption deterrence 
The comparative evidence compiled by the Project across Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda suggests that 
in the three countries, social network dynamics are conducive to corruption in the form of favouritism, 
bribery and even embezzlement. However, the more stringent law enforcement environment in the 
Rwandan case yields important insights into how such factors of sociality adapt under conditions of 
strict law enforcement; how the tensions between formal and informal practices are resolved; and 
ultimately how elements characterising the social fabric in East Africa might be harnessed to improve 
anti-corruption outcomes. 
The research findings suggest that in the context of Rwanda, social networks may open doors to access 
resources and favours but they may also exacerbate risks when a member is caught engaging in corrupt 
transactions, with potential negative implications for the entire network. Particularly notable in this 
regard are the policies implemented by the Rwandan authorities that employ a ‘naming and shaming’ 
approach whereby not only the identities of individuals accused of corruption crimes are published, but 
also the names of their parents and communities of origin, thus explicitly making public shaming 
extensive to the social networks. 
Therefore, it is important to note that in addition to spurring corruption, social networks may also curb 
corruption, for example, by diffusing information about deviant corrupt behaviour or bad service delivery 
through the social network. When government units’ performance is regularly assessed and sanctions 
for underperformance are credible, then incentives are generated in a ways such that workplace 
networks can play an important role in promoting mutual monitoring and even peer pressure towards 
incentivising good performance. Negative appraisals might even lead to dismissal and therefore it has 
become dangerous to engage in informal practices from the perspective of service providers. In such a 
context, social network dynamics exert a deterrence effect. This is alluded to in the following 
observation by a service provider in Kigali; “you see, if I come to work with a temper and then offer a 
bad service to one person, surprisingly the way I gave the service will be communicated to other people 
who are linked to that service seeker. The information may [then] be communicated to my boss.”  
As the previous quote suggests, there is the common perception that bad performance is routinely 
detected and punished in the Rwandan public sector, which is in turn associated with the various 
monitoring and evaluation strategies implemented to ensure quality control and deter petty corruption. 
Policy strategies include the digitisation of services, such as electronic queuing systems that ensure a 
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first come first served rule and the establishment of quality assurance and customer care units in health 
facilities that supervise performance and collect patients’ feedback on a daily basis.  
The research findings also uncovered evidence about the manner in which service providers resolve the 
tensions between adhering to formal rules governing their duties and the informal norms that make 
them feel obliged to respond to their social networks. According to FGD participants, in order to cope 
with such tensions, service providers must find ways to accommodate their network, without directly 
compromising their formal function as the following statement suggests: “to avoid problems with 
citizens we find alternative time for a rendezvous with friends so that citizens’ service delivery is not 
disrupted. Friends or relatives can be offered to come towards the end of the day or [in the] early 
morning. Hence there is no conflict with the order of priority given to any other service seekers. In that 
way, we keep [our] reputation which has an effect on performance.” By doing so, the provider keeps 
adhering to the official responsibilities during working hours while attending to the needs from social 
networks in his or her spare time. 
Thus, the evidence from Rwanda underscores the strong effect of a strict anti-corruption stance on the 
part of the government whereby the increased monitoring and heightened risk of punishment noticeably 
decrease the opportunity space for giving into social pressures and network demands. Meaningfully, in 
Rwanda, service providers account of the troubles they go through in order to accommodate their 
duties vis-à-vis the closest circle of family and friends. This provides stark contrast with countries like 
Uganda, where anti-corruption laws are weakly enforced and the social networks perform a function 
similar to that of a currency, leading to people instrumentally expanding their networks and 
recommending “reasonable” service providers across social networks.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BASEL INSTITUTE ON GOVERNANCE 
 
 22 
6 Mental models: shared ideas and self-
fulfilling prophecies  
Behavioural studies emphasise the importance of automatic thinking, which is the propensity to make 
judgments and choices automatically, rather than deliberatively. Decisions may respond then to the 
presence of frames, which refer to the way choices are presented (for example, as a loss or a gain). 
Automatic thinking can also be associated to anchors, which are contextual aspects that have no direct 
relevance to a decision but that nonetheless affect judgement, leading individuals to jump to 
conclusions on a very partial view of the problem. Choices may also be made on the basis of default 
options, which comprise the modal patterns of behaviour prevailing in any given social context.  
Another key behavioural principle postulates that individuals’ decision making is influenced by the 
mental models prevailing in their culture (World Bank, 2015). Mental models refer to categories and 
stereotypes that people use to make sense of the world and to shape their views. Mental models are 
also relevant to the extent that they shape the roles of different societal actors on the basis of what 
those actors believe is expected of them (ibid.). Shared images and ideas about social roles – including 
what constitutes being a ‘good’ politician, service provider and public official - determine how people 
come to expect themselves and others to behave in different situations (Kotzian, 2011). These 
collective images legitimise behaviours that may have no correlation with formal roles and legal 
mandates, thus opening the way for illicit actions to be tacitly tolerated and even accepted. 
This section explores the impact of automatic thinking and mental models on the predispositions 
towards petty corruption in Rwanda.  
6.1 Rwandan values and the home grown initiatives 
This research reflects broadly on behavioural elements that underpin attitudes towards petty corruption 
and particularly, on the manner in which cultural traditions – and the collectively held mental models 
they generate - promote, or have the potential to promote, practices and behaviours that support anti-
corruption outcomes or, conversely, whether cultural traditions endorse behaviours that fuel corruption. 
There are highly relevant lessons to be learned from the Rwandan case in this regard.  
FGD participants were asked to reflect on traditional Rwandan values that they recognise and are 
familiar with. Their responses included: gusangira [sharing meals and drinks], gutabarana [friendly 
neighbourly intervention and solidarity in moments of need], gucumbikira abashyitsi [hospitality towards 
strangers]; gufungurira abashyitsi cyangwa abagenzi [catering for strangers and travellers]; guha 
umubyeyi amata [giving milk to women who have given birth and have no cow]; guhemba umubyeyi 
[offering presents to families with newborns]; guheka umubyeyi cyangwa umurway [transport of sick 
persons to the hospital]; gacaca/inyangamugayo gukiza amakimbirane [conflict resolution by mediators]. 
Other Rwandan values exalt the desirable virtues like ubunyangamugayo [moral integrity] and ubutwari 
[excellence] as opposed to ill practices like ubugwari [cowardice].      
As the research evidence would indicate, there is a shared familiarity of Rwandan citizens with 
traditional practices that are intrinsic in values of solidarity and social justice. In this regard, the 
significance of the Rwandan so-called home-grown solutions (HGSs) stands out. The Home-grown 
Initiatives (HGIs) refer to state policies and programmes that formalise social practices rooted in 
Rwandan cultural traditions that promote social welfare and community development by appealing to a 
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collective sense of responsibility, solidarity and fraternity (Gatwa forthcoming 2018). There are many 
HGSs that have effectively incorporated traditional values into formal government policy. While 
discussing them all would go beyond the scope of this report, we discuss three paradigmatic examples 
of such home-grown solutions, because this policy innovation is extremely relevant to the discussion of 
behavioural drivers of corruption. 
A first example is the aforementioned Ubudehe social programme, which involves the categorisation of 
citizens by income level so as to determine which level of payment is to be made when accessing public 
services such as health. According to tradition, Ubudehe originally refers to community activities that 
are based on solidarity such as assisting neighbours and the community at large with land cultivation, 
building houses or tending the pasture for the cattle. As Gatwa (forthcoming 2018) clarifies, the 
Ubudehe activity was particularly instrumental in assisting vulnerable groups, such as widows and 
elderly to access public services and who otherwise lacked institutional assistance. With the exception 
of an illness or other well-justified excuse, participation in Ubudehe was mandatory for all community 
members.  
Nowadays, Ubudehe categorisation effectively confers this role to the state of providing support for the 
poorest and most vulnerable groups. Formalising Ubudehe and incorporating it into concrete policy-
making addresses some key behavioural drivers of corruption as Ubudehe reduces the reliance of 
citizens on informal social networks to access public services and social benefits. 
A second example is the Imihigo performance contracts that promote excellence in service delivery, 
accountability and a commitment towards the welfare of the society. Traditionally, Imihigo referred to 
the practice whereby community members would define goals to which they would commit individually, 
reporting through guhiga ibigwi [to vow proudness for heroism], and assuming accountability for their 
achieved performance in public ceremonies in front of their leaders and the entire community. These 
ceremonies, called Guhigura Imihigo or Kwivuga ibigwi, entailed a public eulogy of the individuals’ 
bravery or success before the leader (Gatwa and Uwimbabazi 2016).  
Today, the government has rehabilitated Imihigo as a key public sector performance management 
instrument. It takes the form of a performance contract for officials at all different levels of the public 
administration. The contracts are aimed at achieving objectives aligned with the national development 
plan and include a set of development targets, measured against specific performance indicators, to be 
achieved over a period of one year. In the pursuit of the realisation of those goals, local government 
officials engage communities in different activities, whilst the central government commits to provide all 
necessary financial and technical resources concomitant to the pursuit of the performance targets 
(Gatwa and Uwimbabazi 2016).  
Imihigo has become a highly visible performance-monitoring instrument in Rwanda, which is strongly 
associated with the effective enforcement of the rule of law and to the success in achieving anti-
corruption outcomes. This is further supported by the fact that Imihigo allocates significant budgets to 
Districts and Ministries (part of the decentralised budget) for anti-corruption programmes in support of 
broader good governance interventions. Service providers in the FGDs repeatedly alluded to the fact 
that there is strong determination in Rwandan public administration to increase transparency, 
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performance and accountability – all of which make practices and instances of petty corruption harder 
to encounter.24 
Finally, worthy of special attention are the Itorero educational programmes promoted by the Rwandan 
government. In the history of Rwanda, Itorero was the school of excellence for the Rwandan youth. 
These youths were selected and trained at the chiefs and King’s palaces and equipped with moral and 
intellectual skills. Furthermore, military training of the youths was intended to develop virtues of 
courage, patriotism, endurance, responsibility, social cohesion, tolerance and the rejection of 
corruption and other depraved values.  
Today, Itorero recruits across all strata of society and retreats for several days are organised with the 
aim of reviving traditional values of integrity, creativity and innovation. Consequently, Itorero is still 
regarded as the permanent school for promoting the culture of excellence. It is also the backbone of 
the Ndumunyarwanda philosophy, which strongly emphasises the fight against corruption and the 
reconstruction of a moral society based on the observance of those values and particularly integrity 
[ubunyangamugayo] (Ndikumana and Niyibizi 2016). 
Certainly, not all traditional norms are necessarily conducive to positive social outcomes. FGD 
participants also recounted shared cultural and social practices that could be conducive to bribery. 
Those were discussed in relation to certain sayings based on traditions such as: amatama masa 
ntasabira inka igisigati [empty mouths do not request a pasture to cattle]; the Jyendauzagaruke: go and 
come back tomorrow, which is used as a way for Rwandans to kindle a friendship. FGD participants 
explained that today, some of these are still observable in the expressions used for requesting a bribe 
such as gutura and gutanga amakoro [harvest presents to king or chief]; guhakwa [service to chief or 
king in exchange for favours]; although all of these practices are now prohibited by law.  
Significant is the manner in which the Rwandan regime has implemented what may be viewed as a 
behavioural approach to promoting anti-corruption efforts by means of strengthening shared mental 
models that promote values of integrity, accountability and public duty. To be sure, Ubudehe, Imihigo 
and Itorero communicate a strong message about social justice, accountability and integrity as key 
guiding values that characterise not just the conduct of public affairs, but also the nature of the 
relationship between citizens and government and, ultimately, Rwandan national identity. Therefore, 
official policies explicitly articulate and reinforce the development of a culture – or shared mental model 
– that dictates roles, behaviours and expectations that align with the promotion of good governance 
outcomes. 
This policy approach is especially powerful in that it appeals to social norms and cultural traditions, 
harnessing them to prime individuals on the importance of adopting behaviours conducive to good 
governance outcomes and to avoiding other behaviours that are detrimental to society. This behavioural 
approach is palpable across the country due to the manner in which messages are reinforced via 
environmental cues, such as publicly displayed codes of conduct and messages reinforcing desirable 
and undesirable behaviours in pursuit of the public good. As the Literature Review suggested, 
environmental cues, understood as unspoken signals that trigger certain behaviours, can play a crucial 
role in either eliciting or inhibiting corrupt behaviours (Peiffer and Rose 2014; Bateson, Nettle, and 
                                                      
24 More than half of the annual government’s budget is allocated to the Imihigo projects countrywide, particularly at the local government level, 
where they are elaborated and managed by the corresponding District and Sector authorities. The economic, social and governance sectors 
account respectively for 50%; 30% and 20% of the allocated budget. Imihigo contracts are signed by heads of public institutions in the 
Parliament jointly with the President of the Republic and the achievements are systematically evaluated by an independent agency hired by the 
government; the report is presented to the Parliament by the government under a session jointly chaired by the President of the Republic, the 
Speaker and President of the Senate. Imihigo contracts undergo internal and semi-public evaluation during the annual top leadership retreat 
and before the National Dialogue (bid.). 
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Roberts 2006). In the Rwandan context, examples of such environmental cues can be found 
prominently displayed around the country, for instance, at the main gates of public and private 
institutions or at the roadside on the main road leading to the communities, as shown in the pictures 
below. 
 
Source: authors’ photographs  
Left: The photograph of a District office, a deputy mayor in charge of economic affairs, is attached to his door, including his names and mobile 
and telephone number. Opposite, the major task and duties of the officer are depicted. Underneath, a poster of Transparency International 
says: ‘don’t shy from pointing a finger wherever you see corruption: the law protects you; followed with telephones to call to report corruption 
cases.’ 
Right: This stone photographed alongside the main Road Kigali-Butare/Huye displays the values of a Cell, Kigembe in the District of Kamonyi, 
Gacurabwenge Sector. On the left side, listed are the values to be promoted, contrasted with the anti-values to be eradicated. The ten 
promoted values are: Rwandanness; patriotism; integrity; work ethics and morale; fighting for dignity and self-reliance; cleanliness; courage; 
work by objectives [known in governance domain here as contract of performance]25.  
Interestingly, it was possible to obtain research evidence on how the emphasis on integrity as a central 
value to guide behaviours and choices has impacted the manner in which Rwandan citizens understand 
national identity. Overall, FGD participants expressed feelings of great pride for being called Rwandans. 
Urban participants provided further detailed insights into the extent of priming of values associated with 
national identity. When asked what ‘behaving like a Rwandan’ meant to them, they said that being 
Rwandan is attached to notions of dignity because it gives people credentials. People would nowadays 
feel proud to be Rwandans: umunyarwanda ariyubaha [a Rwandan would cheer up his/her moral values], 
even a taxi driver would not charge more than is required on a journey; umunyarwanda afite ishema 
[Rwandans are proud of their identity]. The participants added: “But there was a time back where, being 
or behaving like a Rwandan was hard to bear; or felt like an insult; or a suspicion of accusation!” 
Another important point is that, overall, Rwandans not only seem to appreciate the benefits of good 
service delivery, but have taken great pride in these changes and the resulting improvements in their 
livelihoods. The majority of participants appreciated the value and benefits of having a well-functioning 
health care system and a national police that is improving its relations to citizens. Also, according to the 
research participants, citizens greatly appreciate the weekly ‘day of accountability’ known as Umunsi 
w’ibibazo [the day for answering the citizens’ concerns], during which the government authorities make 
                                                      
25 Many different tools of communication are used cross the country by public institutions, Districts, Sectors, Cells, schools, hospitals and 
clinics and other public and private institutions to display moral values promoting the fight against corruption.  
BASEL INSTITUTE ON GOVERNANCE 
 
 26 
themselves available to respond to any needs of the population. At the same time, research participants 
recognised that officers who work with probity and integrity are well respected these days because of 
the campaign for dignity and the rehabilitation of Rwandan values of integrity [ndiumunyarwanda; 
agaciro]. This latter point is extremely important as socially constructed determinants of status and 
respectability have been proved to be key elements shaping decision-making and promoting and 
reinforcing distinct behavioural patterns (Koni-Hoffmann and Navanit-Patel 2017). 
6.2 Perceptions about the prevalence of corruption in Rwanda  
In comparison with neighbouring countries, such as Tanzania and Uganda, Rwandan survey respondents 
account for relatively low levels of petty corruption. Whereas in Uganda and Tanzania respectively 60% 
and 45% of respondents strongly agree that corruption is inescapable, in Rwanda only 23% of 
respondents shared that view. Figure 3 provides more details on the perceived prevalence of corruption 
in Rwanda, including both urban and rural perspectives. 
 
 Is corruption inescapable in Rwanda?  
In fact, the research findings strongly confirmed a shared perception among citizens that corruption in 
the country is not the norm and that engaging in corrupt actions is a highly risky endeavour given the 
high possibility of being caught and facing severe punishments. In particular, participants were very well 
aware of the consequences of engaging in acts of corruption, particularly the manner in which those 
acts are publicly shamed and perpetrators put on display by Rwandan enforcement and anti-corruption 
entities.  
Significantly, FGD participants stated that Rwandan institutions are very efficient in identifying and 
fighting corrupt practices. High levels of trust in state institutions are also evident in the survey results, 
observing that 70% of the respondents have ‘total trust’ in the Office of the President’ and cumulatively 
64% of the respondents indicate having ‘high trust’ or ‘total trust’ in the Office of the Ombudsman. This 
suggests the effectiveness of the use of media campaigns to raise awareness about prevailing anti-
corruption rules as well as the systematic punishment of offences committed. Consequentially, trust in 
public institutions is quite high in Rwanda, as Figure 4 shows. 
These findings strongly support the assessment that control of corruption in Rwanda is facilitated by the 
presence of particular frames, whereby individual choices and behaviours are affected by perceptions of 
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generalised patterns of behaviours of others in the shared context. Thus, the prevailing ‘narrow frame’ 
seems to be the common belief that people generally avoid corrupt behaviours.26 Mental models about 
the state’s strong monitoring capabilities and especially its law enforcement agencies reinforce this. 
These perceptions are also shaped by the stringency of the sanctions that the Rwandan criminal code 
establishes for cases of corruption and by experiences of real instances where the corruption-detection 
and investigation efforts of the relevant state agencies have demonstrated success.  
 
 Average responses regarding trust in institutions in Rwanda (1 = no trust, 2 = low trust, 3 = indifferent, 4 = high trust and 5 = total 
trust) 
To give an example, there was a time when the police used special money that had been tempered with 
to track people who were suspected of corruption. From that time onwards, people have become 
extremely suspicious and apprehensive about accepting something from an ‘unknown’ person - thinking 
that such a person may be an undercover officer from the anti-corruption unit. In fact, FGD participants 
in the group of service providers explicitly argued that one cannot take the risk of accepting a bribe at 
the workplace as agents from the Office of the Ombudsman might be monitoring.  
In another account, an individual was stopped twice over traffic violations and asked for a bribe. In one 
case, the participant, whose offence [dangerous overtaking] carried a fine of 50,000 RWF, was asked to 
pay 15,000 to go free. When the proposition was turned down the officer let the individual go without 
imposing the official penalty. In the second case, the same individual was pulled over for speeding, 
whereby the officer, after explaining the gravity of the offence and returning the car documents, said: 
“now you can pay a beer if you want.” The individual again declined to pay the bribe and was again let 
off without being fined. The meaningful lesson from these accounts resides in how the driver evaluated 
each situation; wondering whether the bribe requests had been a ruse and would have convicted him or 
her of committing a corruption offense or whether the officials simply forgave the infractions.  
The insights provided showcase the importance of non-behavioural incentives (monitoring and 
punishment) combined with behavioural factors (dissemination of key messages and redefinition of the 
                                                      
26 A narrow frame is understood as those references to which the automatic system of the mind resorts to in order to evaluate a situation or 
that which “automatically comes to mind” WDR (2015, p. 6). 
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determinants of status and social shaming) and their role in shaping shared mental models. As a result 
of said interplay, corruption has become a clandestine, hidden and even stigmatised matter in Rwanda.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BASEL INSTITUTE ON GOVERNANCE 
 
 29 
7 Conclusions 
7.1 Behavioural determinants of petty corruption in Rwanda  
The research findings confirm the results from international assessments, such as the leading 
corruption and bribery indices and indicators, that levels of petty corruption are remarkably low in 
Rwanda. Also, in contrast with the experience in other East African countries, the formal rules and 
regulations governing the public sector tend to be adequately followed and rights and entitlements are 
good predictors of actual service delivery experiences among users. These overall positive results are 
undoubtedly attributable to strong perceptions among users and providers alike that performance-
monitoring mechanisms are effective and that detection and punishment of rule breaking is the norm. 
Therefore, one of the key lessons that stems from the evidence collected from the Rwandan case is the 
strategic role played by top-down enforcement of anti-corruption measures in promoting systemic 
change. 
Interestingly, in terms of behavioural factors rooted in sociality, in some important dimensions the 
Rwandan context is not very different from the realities prevailing in neighbouring countries such as 
Uganda and Tanzania. The similarities are preponderantly associated with the central role of informal 
social networks in the lives of citizens. Just like in its neighbouring countries, social networks are 
essential to Rwanda’s social fabric because they link individuals and communities through strong bonds 
based on values of solidarity and reciprocity that underpin shared ideals of social justice. Those social 
bonds also generate strong feelings of obligation toward the welfare of one’s group, which can 
aggravate risks of petty corruption involving favouritism, bribing and embezzlement.  
On the basis of the similar social backgrounds, the Rwandan experience garners invaluable insights by 
illustrating how strong vertical monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms affect the drivers of corruption 
associated with sociality. Overall, the conclusion may be drawn that the Rwandan government has put 
measures in place that significantly compromise or make irrelevant the functionality of social networks 
as a means to get things done. Furthermore, the research findings suggest that network size is related 
to functionality, as in Rwanda the relevant reference group is for the most part limited to the family and 
very close friends, whereas in Uganda (and until recently in Tanzania) cliques tend to be extensive, often 
consisting of multiple overlapping social networks.  
A close look at the evidence provided by the Rwandan case brings out two important attributes about 
social networks that have implications for the region. Firstly, the functionality of extensive social 
networks is correlated with the quality of public services. It is difficult to imagine that the reference 
networks in Rwanda could be as constrained if the quality and accessibility of public services were not 
safeguarded. In other words, in Rwanda, individuals are usually able to solve their problems and access 
services without having to resort to informal network mechanisms. Secondly, the essential values and 
norms that underpin the practices of the networks can actually be harnessed to promote better social 
outcomes. The research suggests that strongly held values based on notions of reciprocity can take on 
a different meaning when an individual’s (corrupt) action has negative consequences for the group. 
Reciprocity in this context is transformed into a motivation that keeps people from hurting each other 
by avoiding illegal actions whereby a culprit in a crime of corruption would bring shame to the family 
and the community. The same can be said of workplace-based networks where the performance 
evaluation of the whole unit can be compromised by single acts of deviant individuals. As will be argued 
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below, those same values and beliefs can be the basis for developing targeted approaches aimed at 
addressing favouritism. 
The ambivalence of gift-giving in Rwanda is also similar to what occurs in neighbouring countries when 
it takes place in the context of the provision of public services. But in Rwanda several measures, 
including the digitisation of queuing systems and the obligation to report monetary gifts exceeding a 
certain amount, have worked to reinforce a decreased instrumentality of gift-giving and network-
building. This is an example of how social norms can adapt to an environment characterised by stricter 
anti-corruption enforcement. 
The Rwandan case also demonstrates how automatic thinking and mental models can be influenced 
through policy. Strong beliefs about the high probability of detection and punishment of corrupt 
behaviours were palpable across all participants in the study. Such beliefs strongly shape behaviours - 
as the literature suggests – due to the influence of ‘narrow frames’. In Rwanda, a narrow frame is 
present that reflects the notion that corruption is an uncommon occurrence and severely punished. 
Mental models that recognise that behaving with integrity leads to publicly rewarded behaviours; 
whereas contrary actions are conducive to shaming and disgrace, also reinforce such a narrow frame. 
The latter highlights the pivotal role of leadership. It is not coincidental that levels of trust towards state 
actors are high in Rwanda, particularly when it comes to the President. It is meaningful that Rwandans 
were strongly aware of the zero-tolerance approach to corruption that is observed and expected even 
from individuals at the highest levels in the political hierarchy, whereas in Uganda research participants 
frequently made reference to corrupt actions by the top leadership to justify and rationalise their own 
involvement in corrupt actions. In Rwanda, examples of exemplary punishment can be recounted and 
public acts to hold top government officials to account are organised on a regular basis. These actions 
are key in shaping mental models, reinforcing the notion that corruption is not tolerated and 
underscoring the public value that is given to integrity and good performance.27 
It is telling that petty corruption in Rwanda, in the forms presented here, takes purportedly place in 
secrecy that often involves planning on the part of culprits. This can be understood as a consequence 
of the widespread acknowledgement that engaging in corruption is highly risky and cannot be done in 
the open. Paradoxically, it appears that the success in combatting corruption has resulted in overall 
improvements regarding the prevalence of corrupt practices, but as a consequence, the few remaining 
instances and recurring forms of petty corruption are significantly more difficult to identify and detect. 
7.2 Policy implications 
The fact that favouritism in the Rwandan health sector continues to be an issue - in spite of strong law 
enforcement - relates to issues of social status and perceived moral imperatives towards one’s 
reference group. Service providers, who are at the intersection between the formal legal and the 
informal social normative frameworks, understand and experience first-hand the tensions and the 
contradictions that emanate from social network demands. In this regard, the fact that favouritism is 
fuelled by strong expectations about obligation and reciprocity can be harnessed to develop a public 
education campaign that precisely underscores that by forgoing demands of undue preferential 
treatment and favouritism, both the provider and the family are better off, thereby ensuring to protect 
the reputation and ultimately the employment of the family member.  
                                                      
27 One well-known example took place in the Ministry of Health, where senior staff were said to be under the protection of the Minister, who 
was considered ‘untouchable’, while abusing huge public funds in ordering drugs and other medical equipment. However, the officers were 
dismissed, prosecuted and the Minister even lost her position. 
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• Media “edutainment” campaign that uncovers the hidden costs that favouritism generates and 
support a culture reinforcing the recognition that public officials cannot use their positions to 
favour anyone regardless of feelings of solidarity and affection. Stories could be emphasised in 
which favouritism leads to the guilty provider being shamed and losing his or her job and 
thereby inflicting greater costs on the family in the long run. 
Gift-giving is another practice that is socially grounded and that becomes particularly problematic when 
taking place in the context of public service provisions.  
• Campaign educating citizens that it is not necessary to reciprocate a service that a citizen is 
entitled to receive in the first place. Using a catchy slogan to reinforce the message in the media 
could be further reinforced by means of physical symbols at the workplace, such as an approach 
adopted in Serbia where health staff were required to wear pins with the legend “I work for the 
salary, not for the gift.”  
An area of particular concern regards that some service users - especially from the rural FGDs - 
reported being fearful about retributions from reporting corrupt service providers.  
• Strengthening the anonymity of current complaints mechanisms would be a positive albeit not 
sufficient step. For example, both Transparency International and the Office of the Ombudsman 
use suggestion boxes; which could be improved in terms of reinforcing trust in their anonymity, 
if the hierarchies of the tested institutions were to be the only ones having access keys. The 
opening process should be made public and transparent and officers suspected of corruption 
should be instructed to respond publicly. 
High fines for traffic violations came out strongly as generating perhaps unnecessary corruption risks. 
• Consider revisions to the fines associated with traffic violations. 
Another key topic emerging from the research findings and that is reason for grave concern is the 
apparent prevalence of sexual corruption. The Ombudsman shared these concerns and recognised the 
high prevalence of such practices and underscored the challenge given by the very low rates of 
denunciation. Consequently, this problem deserves special attention, particularly because sexual 
corruption is hardly comparable to other types of corruption. For instance, one key question is whether 
in cases of sexual corruption the actions of both the bribe taker and the bribe giver should be equally 
criminalised. Some scholars have made the argument that regardless of whom requests the sexual 
exchange, only the public official and not the woman should face corruption charges, mainly because 
the power asymmetry makes any argument about consent questionable. Corruption charges however 
should proceed when a woman makes a sexual proposal to obtain a favour from a public official and the 
latter refuses, then the woman is guilty of attempted bribery (Gitlin 2016). If one were to agree with this 
interpretation, then it would be of utmost importance to raise awareness among male public officials of 
the implications and consequences of accepting sexual favours from the public, possibly in a light that 
makes such offenses particularly shameful and costly. This message could be disseminated and 
reinforced via “edutainment” campaigns where positive role models could be reinforced. Positive role 
models of socially engaged, empowered women could also be sought out to improve denouncing rates 
among victims of sexual corruption. A positive experience fighting sexual corruption in the education 
sector in Cameroon involved enabling female students at the University to bring their grievances about 
unwanted sexual advances by professors to one of the highly respected Vice-Chancellors, who 
represented a female role model in a position of influence and power (Little 2014).  
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• Raise costs – in terms of criminal sanctions and social shaming - of soliciting or accepting 
sexual favours on the part of male public officials. Establish safe whistle-blower mechanisms for 
women to denounce unwanted sexual advances preferably linked to a strong, positive female 
role model. 
The research on behavioural drivers of corrupt behaviours delivers evidence about the processes and 
areas that are promising entry points for developing interventions aiming at promoting behavioural 
change in support of better development outcomes. However, as is also evident from the research, 
adequate contextualisation of any development intervention is crucial and, in the case of behavioural 
interventions particularly, since it is extremely difficult to predict which precise approach is going to be 
most effective at appealing and making sense to the intended beneficiaries. Therefore, practitioners 
must be prepared to experiment and test different approaches to find those to which the target 
populations are most responsive. 
• Develop pilot interventions that test different approaches to behavioural interventions by means 
of rigorous experimental methods such as randomised control trials in order to discover the 
most effective programme models. 
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